Contract Reference

Solidity sources live in the contracts/ folder of the monorepo. Built with Foundry + OpenZeppelin, pragma ^0.8.27, via_ir = true.

Deployed addresses

Deterministic CREATE2 — same address on every network:

Live on Arbitrum One, Base, BNB Chain, Ethereum, Polygon and Arbitrum Sepolia (testnet) — same addresses on every network.

BVCCSmartWalletV2 — personal wallet (walletType 0)

One contract per user, deployed by the factory. No proxies, no upgradability.

• ●Signer: WebAuthn / P-256 public key (passkey), fixed at deployment. Every execute() is authenticated via ERC-4337 UserOp signature validation.
• ●Execution: ERC-7821 batched execution (execute(bytes32 mode, bytes executionData) with Execution[] batches).
• ●Fee: 0.05% per operation to the BVCC fee wallet (0x3e3eb089169a7315a994947465ce5f5FC3A307D4), three cases — (1) ETH send: fee deducted from the sent value; (2) ERC-20 transfer: fee charged on top, the wallet must hold amount + fee; (3) DeFi/swap: balance snapshot before/after, fee on detected token balance increases.
• ●Recovery: 3 guardian addresses, set once at creation. Replacing the WebAuthn signer requires 2-of-3 guardian signatures + a 48-hour timelock. Recovery functions bypass execute() and pay no fee.

BVCCAgentWalletV2 — AI agent wallet (walletType 1)

Extends BVCCSmartWalletV2; adds delegated execution for authorized agent EOAs. Fee is 0.15%.

AuthorizeParams (input to authorizeAgent)

Whitelists max 20 entries each. The four token arrays must have equal length.

Owner functions (callable only via the wallet’s own execute(), i.e. biometrics / WebAuthn)

function authorizeAgent(AuthorizeParams calldata p) external; // re-auth PRESERVES spending history
function revokeAgent(address agent) external;                 // active = false, history kept
function increaseBudget(address agent, uint128 additionalWei) external;
function pauseAgents() external;                              // emergency stop, blocks executeAsAgent
function unpauseAgents() external;

Agent functions

function executeAsAgent(bytes32 mode, bytes calldata executionData) external; // nonReentrant, whenNotPaused

See the Agent Integration Guide for call encoding, validation order and error reference.

Getters

function getAgentPermission(address agent) external view returns (AgentPermission memory);
function getAgents() external view returns (address[] memory);
function getDailySpent(address agent) external view returns (uint128);
function getTokenSpent(address agent, address token) external view returns (uint128 dailySpent, uint128 totalSpent);
function walletType() public pure returns (uint8); // 0 = personal, 1 = agent

Factories

Both factories share the same shape:

constructor(address owner_); // owner = kill-switch admin, separate from deployer and fee wallet

function getWalletAddress(uint256 pubKeyX, uint256 pubKeyY) public view returns (address);
function createWallet(uint256 pubKeyX, uint256 pubKeyY, address[3] memory guardians, string calldata credentialId)
    external returns (address wallet);
function isDeployed(address wallet) external view returns (bool);
function kill() external; // owner-only, one-way: permanently blocks NEW wallet creation

• ●Deterministic address: salt = keccak256(abi.encode(pubKeyX, pubKeyY)) — derived only from the passkey’s P-256 public key. Same key → same wallet address on every network. Guardians don’t affect the address (set post-deploy via setGuardians, callable once).
• ●Counterfactual: getWalletAddress is a view — you can receive funds at the address before deploying.
• ●Idempotent: createWallet returns the existing wallet if already deployed.
• ●Kill switch: kill() stops new creations only; existing wallets are independent contracts and keep working with their funds.

Security notes

• ●Internal security review (bilingual report in the monorepo’s audits/ folder): HIGH finding (approve cap-bypass) fixed; 131/131 Foundry tests pass; Slither clean of real findings.
• ●V2 (June 2026) fixed a gas-griefing edge on Arbitrum: balance probes are now capped at 100k gas (PROBE_GAS_CAP) so calldata that happens to contain a precompile address can’t burn the transaction’s gas.